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Case Comments
Constitutional Law-Due Process: No Constitutional
Right to Trial by Jury for Juveniles in
Delinquency Proceedings
Petitioners were charged with acts of juvenile delinquency
under Pennsylvania' and North Carolina2 law. McKeiver and
Terry were charged with offenses which, if committed by adults,
would have constituted felonies and misdemeanors, respectively,
under Pennsylvania law, while Burrus and forty-four other black
children were charged with offenses ordinarily constituting mis-
demeanors in North Carolina. 3 The North Carolina charges arose
out of a series of racial demonstrations in Hyde County. Each
petitioner unsuccessfully requested trial by jury in the juvenile
delinquency proceedings and these denials were upheld by the
resbective state supreme courts. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Pennsylvania and North Carolina de-
cisions,4 holding that trial by jury in state juvenile delinquency
1. PA. STAT. ANN. 11 § 243 (4) (a) (Purdon 1965).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-21(1) (1966), now § 7A-278(2) (1969).
3. McKeiver was charged with robbery, larceny and receiving
stolen goods. Conviction in a criminal prosecution on the same charges
would involve the following maximum penalties: For robbery, a fine of
$5,000 and imprisonment for ten years, PA. STAT. ANN. 18 § 4704 (Pur-
don 1963); for larceny, a fine of $2,000 and imprisonment for five years.
id. § 4807; and for receiving stolen property, a $1,000 fine and five
years in prison, id. § 4817.
Terry was charged with assault, battery and conspiracy. For as-
sault and battery an adult would face a maximum penalty of a $1,000
fine and two years in prison. Id. § 4708. For conspiracy an adult
could be fined up to $500 and imprisoned for up to two years or both.
Id. § 4302.
Misdemeanors in North Carolina are punishable by a fine, by im-
prisonment for up to two years, or both. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 (a)
(1969).
However, because all of the petitioners were brought before juve-
nile courts, each faced possible confinement until twenty-one. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. 110-21 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. 11 § 254 (Purdon,
1965). Hence McKeiver, who otherwise might have been subject to
ten years' confinement, faced, at the most, only five years of confine-
ment since he was 16 years old at the time of his adjudication of de-
linquency, while in the case of some eleven year old North Carolina
petitioners, an otherwise two-year sentence could become a ten-year
period of incarceration.
4. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969); In re Terry,
438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
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proceedings is not constitutionally required. McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, No. 322; In re Burrus, No. 128, 403 U.S. 528 (1971)."
The juvenile court system was founded on the assumption
that youths are not as blameworthy as adults and that a more en-
lightened treatment would have a greater likelihood of curtailing
their criminal activity. 6 Therefore the juvenile was viewed as
an object of assistance rather than retribution. This led judges
to pay more attention to the social background of the individual
than to the jurisdictional basis for his presence before the court.1
In practice the court often assumed the form and function of a
social service agency at the expense of its judicial function.8 As
a result of this shift in emphasis, rights generally regarded as
constitutionally required in adult criminal prosecutions were con-
sidered unnecessary in juvenile delinquency proceedingsY
This system continued throughout the United States during
the first half of the twentieth century without ever being sub-
jected to significant evaluation. The United States Supreme
Court had never passed upon the constitutionality of the denial to
children of rights considered fundamental to adults. Only occa-
sionally did any member of the judiciary criticize the juvenile
court system. 10 But nonjudicial criticism of the juvenile courts'
cavalier treatment of the rights of juveniles mounted steadily"
5. The Court was divided 6-3 in No. 322 and 5-4 in No. 128,
Brennan, J., joining the dissenters Douglas, Black and Marshall, JJ., in
the latter case.
6. An early classic statement of the juvenile court philosophy is
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
7. S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ITS
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 32 (1966).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., People v. Dotson, 46 Cal. 2d 891, 299 P.2d 875 (1956)
(right to counsel); In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205, 183 P.2d 282
(1947) (privilege against self-incrimination); Rooks v. Tindall, 138
Ga. 863, 76 S.E. 378 (1912) (right to counsel); Bryant v. Brown, 151
Miss. 398, 118 So. 184 (1928) (preponderance of the evidence is suffi-
cient for finding of delinquency); In re Mont, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 103
A.2d 460 (1954) (privilege against self-incrimination); In re Holmes,
175 Pa. Super. 137, 103 A.2d 454 (1954) (privilege against self-incrimi-
nation).
10. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932)
(Crane, J., dissenting); In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954)(Musmanno, J., dissenting).
11. See F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 43-61
(1964); THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENT, TASK
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 19-40 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT]; W. SHERIDAN ED., STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS (1966); S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL,
note 7 supra; Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Fortas, Equal Rights-For Whom? 42 N.Y.U.
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in the decade prior to the 1967 landmark decision of In re Gault."2
In Gault the Court declared that "neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.' 3 Spe-
cifically the Court held that, in delinquency proceedings which
could result in incarceration, due process requires that each de-
fendant be afforded (1) adequate notice of charges; (2) the right
to be represented by counsel; (3) the privilege against self-incrim-
ination; and (4) the right to confrontation and cross-examination
of sworn witnesses. While broadly criticizing the theory of the
juvenile courts,14 the Court nevertheless emphasized the limited
nature of its holding: "We do not mean by this to indicate that
the hearing to be held must conform with all of the require-
ments of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative
hearing .... ,"15 Yet the Court did not clearly specify the test
for determining which other rights granted to adults should also
be given to children in juvenile delinquency proceedings. By its
rather sweeping dicta, its narrow ruling and its failure to un-
ambiguously establish criteria for future decisions, the Court
retained the freedom to either extend or limit the rights of
juveniles and remain within the scope of Gault.
This ambiguity as to the implications of Gault has led pre-
dictably to a certain amount of disagreement. Gault has been
read by numerous courts and commentators as endorsing a se-
L. REv. 401 (1967); Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41
nM-N. L. REv. 547 (1957); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juve-
nile Courts, 67 COLmvJ. L. REv. 281 (1967); Comment, Criminal Offenders
in the Juvenile Court: More Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 1171 (1966).
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gerald Gault, 15, was taken into custody on
the complaint of a neighbor that Gerald and a companion had made a
lewd phone call. The petition against him was filed and the hearing
held the next day. The petition, which was not served upon Gerald or
his parents, alleged little more than the boy was a minor and that he
was delinquent.
Neither at this hearing nor at the one following were there any
sworn witnesses or transcripts of the proceedings. The complainant
did not appear, despite a request by Mrs. Gault that she do so. At no
time was Gerald or his mother informed of their rights to counsel or to
remain silent.
At the conclusion of the second hearing, Gerald was committed as
a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School for an indeterminate
period that could have lasted up to six years. The law which Gerald
allegedly violated was punishable when applied to an adult by a $5 to$50 fine and/or a maximum imprisonment of two months.
13. Id. at 13.
14. The Court said: "The constitutional and theoretical basis for
this peculiar system is-to say the least-debatable." Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 30. The Court was quoting from Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
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lective item-by-item approach to the incorporation of due process
protections into the juvenile court system. Such an approach
would entail a "balancing" process in which the protection a par-
ticular right is designed to provide is weighed against the positive
benefit of denying the right in the juvenile court context or the
special characteristics of the juvenile court which make the pro-
tection unnecessary. 6 Others have interpreted Gault as logical-
ly compelling juvenile courts to give juveniles all of the pro-
cedural protections afforded adults.1 7
The source of this disagreement seems to be largely a result
of the lengthy discussion in Gault of the beneficial aspects of
the juvenile court system. Justice Fortas concluded that "the
observance of due process standards, intelligently and not ruth-
lessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or
displace any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile proc-
ess."'1 8  One interpretation of this discussion in Gault is that if
a substantial benefit is lost by affording a specific procedural
protection, the Court would be unwilling to say that due process
demands the loss of that benefit. Yet it also can be argued, as
in the dissent in McKeiver,19 that Gault, in its concern for depri-
vation of liberty and the stigma of a finding of delinquency, log-
ically compels wholesale incorporation of adult due process pro-
tections into the juvenile court system.20 If this interpretation is
given to Gault, the Court's analysis of the benefits of the system
can be explained as simply an attempt to dispel the traditional no-
tion that juvenile courts can provide special benefits only by
denying due process protections usually afforded in adult crim-
inal prosecutions. This view finds significant support in the fact
that the benefits which the Gault court discussed pertained to the
post-adjudicative stage of the juvenile court process, viz., cor-
rectional facilities separate from adults, avoidance of the stigma
of criminality and retention of civil rights.2' It is difficult to see
how constitutional protections would interfere with these bene-
fits. As Professor Paulsen paraphrased Gault, the "legitimate
16. See, e.g., cases cited note 28 infra.
17. See In re T., 1 Cal. App. 3d 344, 81 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1969);
Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 167 S.E.2d 163 (1969); Fonesca v.
Judges of The Family Court, 59 Misc. 2d 492, 299 N.Y.S.2d 493 (Sup.
Ct. 1969); Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968);
Glen, Juvenile Court Reform: Procedural Process and Substantive
Stasis, 1970 WIs. L. REv. 431.
18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967).
19. See note 65 infra.
20. See Glen, note 17 supra, at 437.
21. Inre Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1967).
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aims of specialized courts for children will not be impaired by
applying due process standards to them."22
The Supreme Court failed to resolve these differing views of
Gault in In re Winship,23 holding that due process requires that
guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in state criminal cases
and in juvenile delinquency proceedings based upon a criminal
act which may result in deprivation of liberty. The analysis of
the majority opinion, written by Justice Brennan, suggests that
the Court took into consideration whether the reasonable doubt
standard "would risk destruction of beneficial aspects of the
juvenile process." 24 This would indicate a balancing approach to
juvenile rights. Yet, as in Gault, it was again left unclear
whether an opposite finding in this respect would have changed
the result. If not, this would support the wholesale incorporation
interpretation of Gault. That the opinion is inconclusive on this
point is suggested by the fact that two members of the majority
for whom Brennan wrote in Winship later rejected the balancing
approach in McKeiver.25
State and lower federal court cases involving the right to
trial by jury demonstrated the difficulty in applying the Gault
and Winship opinions to issues beyond those expressly consid-
ered therein. The United States Supreme Court had held in
Duncan v. Louisiana 2 6 that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
trial by jury in criminal prosecutions was a part of the Four-
teenth Amendment due process requirement in state criminal
proceedings except in the case of petty offenses. Lower courts
were divided concerning the application of this right to juveniles.
The majority view prior to McKeiver was, as it was prior to
Gault,27 that the right to trial by jury was not a constitutional
requirement in juvenile court proceedings. This was justified in
various ways. The jury was thought to detract from the informal-
ity of the juvenile court, a beneficial element in the system which,
it was argued, was not intended to be eliminated by the Gault
decision.28 Alternatively, courts concluded that the Bill of Rights
22. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile
Court, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 233, 241 (emphasis supplied).
23. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
24. Id. at 366.
25. Douglas and Marshall, JJ. See text accompanying note 61
infra.
26. 391.S. 145 (1968).
27. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965).
28. Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319 (Ind. 1970); State v. Turner,
253 Ore. 235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211
Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967); In re Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d
263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968).
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is not applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings because such
proceedings are nominally civil, 29 or simply that Gault did not
compel such a holding. 30 However, several other courts did hold
that in light of Gault and Duncan due process required that the
juvenile be given the right to trial by jury.3" Despite these con-
flicting opinions, the Supreme Court refused to review the ques-
tion32 until the McKeiver case.
In McKeiver the Supreme Court was divided over the ques-
tion whether incorporation of adult rights into juvenile proceed-
ings should be selective, and if so, what the standard for such se-
lection should be. Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief Justice
and Justices Stewart and White, eschewed the civil/criminal la-
belling method of ascertaining what rights juveniles are to be ac-
corded. The standard derived from Gault, he declared, is funda-
mental fairness, which he defined largely in terms of the accuracy
of the findings of fact.3 3 For various reasons, the four justices
concluded that this standard of fundamental fairness had been
met in the controversies before the Court notwithstanding the
denial of a jury trial. The thirteen numbered concluding para-
graphs of the opinion present two basic arguments supporting the
29. In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 311, 255 N.E.2d 380, 383 (1970);
In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 531, 255 A.2d 419, 426 (1969); People v.
Larry K. & Samuel K., 58 Misc. 2d 526, 529, 296 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (Sup.
Ct. 1968); People v. "Y.O. 2404," 57 Misc. 2d 30, 32, 291 N.Y.S.2d 510,
514 (Sup. Ct. 1968); In re Agler, 15 Ohio App. 2d 240, 247, 240 N.E.2d
874, 878 (1968). This is a surprising rationale in view of the Gault
Court's explicit rejection of the argument that juvenile proceedings being
civil rather than criminal, the Bill of Rights is not applicable. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
30. People v. Larry K. & Samuel K., 58 Misc. 2d 526, 529, 296
N.Y.S.2d 404, 407 (Sup. Ct. 1968); In re Benn, 18 Ohio App. 2d 97,
100, 247 N.E.2d 335, 337 (1969).
31. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968) (statutory construc-
tion); In re Daniel Richard D., 34 A.D.2d 41, 310 N.Y.S.2d 82 (App.
Div. 1970); People v. Michael A.C., 32 App. Div. 2d 554, 300 N.Y.S.2d
816 (1969); People ex rel. Browne v. Kendall, 62 Misc. 2d 196, 308
N.Y.S.2d 572 (Cty. Ct. 1970); People v. Day, 61 Misc. 2d 786, 306
N.Y.S.2d 610 (Cty. Ct. 1969).
32. An opportunity to do so arose in DeBacker v. Brainard, 183
Neb. 461, 161 N.W.2d 508 (1968). The Nebraska Supreme Court was
of the opinion, by a 4-3 margin, that juvenile offenders were entitled
to trial by jury, but the appeal failed since under the Nebraska consti-
tution, the vote of five justices is needed to declare a statute unconsti-
tutional. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, Black and Douglas,
JJ., dissenting. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28 (1969). The ground
for the dismissal was that the case antedated Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), and that Duncan was to be applied only prospec-
tively. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
33. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
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fairness of juvenile nonjury trials and militating against the con-
stitutional requirement of trial by jury in juvenile proceedings.
First, Justice Blackmun noted that the weight of authority is
against such a requirement. He observed that neither the author-
itative Task Force Report on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth
Crime,34 the Uniform Juvenile Court Act,35 the Standard Juvenile
Court Act,36 nor the Legislative Guide for Drafting Family and
Juvenile Court Acts3 7 had favored trial by jury in delinquency
proceedings.38 Furthermore, he noted that at least 29 states and
the District of Columbia denied the juvenile the right to a jury
trial, and in most states the denial had been upheld as a matter
of constitutional law since Gault.39
The opinions expressed in the model acts and by the Presi-
dent's commission, however, cannot be regarded as convincing
constitutional authority. Moreover, although the general prac-
tice among the states has been a factor considered in deciding
whether specific procedural protections are fundamental to due
process,40 the Gault case itself clearly emphasized that such a
consideration is not decisive.4 1 Gault rejected the contention that
due process protections were unavailable to juveniles because
juvenile court proceedings are civil rather than criminal.42  In
doing so, the Court departed from the general view of the state
courts during the previous half-century of the courts' exist-
ence.43 Thus in this context, a rigid adherence to precedent can
be regarded as little more than a make-weight argument.
The second major idea contained in Justice Blackmun's con-
clusions is implicit in the sum of the other enumerated points.
Basically it is that the benefits to be preserved by withholding
34. See TASK FORCE REPORT, note 11 supra, at 38.
35. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT ACT § 24(a)
(1968).
36. See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE ASSOCIATION, THE STAND-
ARD JUVENILE COURT ACT, Art. V, § 19 (1959).
37. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, SOCIAL AND REaABILITATION SERVICE,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHI, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, LEG-
ISLATiVE GUIDE FOR DRAFTING FAMILY AND JUVENILE COURT AcTs § 29 (a)
(1969).
38. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545-46, 549-50 (1971).
39. Id. at 548-49.
40. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-55 (1968);
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 267-72 (1948).
41. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
42. Id. at 50.
43. See Antieau, note 11 supra, at 388; Paulsen, note 11 supra, at
19711
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the right to jury trial far outweigh the importance of the right in
contributing to the fairness of the proceeding. A jury, Justice
Blackmun warned, might remake the juvenile proceeding into a
fully adversarial process which would be repugnant to the goal of
informality.44 He speculated that the use of juries would also
cause delay and would lead to public trials. 4 5 On the other
hand, he could perceive no protection provided by the right to a
jury trial which could outweigh the benefits of informality, speed
and confidentiality. A jury, he observed, would not necessarily
be fairer, nor would it strengthen the fact-finding function of
the juvenile court.46
Accepting arguendo Justice Blackmun's analysis of Gault-
that a balancing test should be used to determine whether to se-
lectively incorporate adult rights into juvenile proceedings-his
application of that test is deficient as to both the supposed bene-
fits of denying juveniles a jury trial and the protection provided
by the right to a jury trial.
First, Justice Blackmun's opinion fails to articulate persua-
sive policy considerations which would outweigh the advantages
of the right to a jury trial. The importance of informailty to the
rehabilitative process has been seriously questioned. It has been
argued by many that a more formal hearing will impress upon
the juvenile the gravity of his offense, with resulting therapeutic
and/or deterrent effects. 4 7 In fact, the Gault court questioned
the rehabilitative value of informality.48 In accord with this
changing attitude it is submitted that informality is a highly
overrated element and an insubstantial reason for excluding the
jury trial from the body of procedural due process for juveniles.
That juries would cause long delays in the juvenile court system
is refuted by the experience of those jurisdictions which do allow
juries in juvenile proceedings. Juries in fact are rarely re-
quested by juveniles. 49 Finally, to argue that the possibility of
44. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
45. Id. at 550.
46. Id. at 547. It has been suggested that a jury of adults in a
juvenile proceeding may prove to be harsher and more arbitrary than
would a judge. George, Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings: The Due
Process Model, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 315, 327 (1968). But see Note,
Juveniles and Their Right to a Jury Trial, 15 VILL. L. REV. 972, 994
(1970).
47. S. WHEELER & L. CoTmnELL, JR., note 7 supra, at 37-38; Parker,
Instant Maturation for the Post-Gault "Hood", 4 FAM. L.Q. 113 (1970);
Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COL. L. REV.
281, 284 (1967); Comment, note 11 supra, at 1217.
48. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967).
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 564-66 (1971) (appen-
dix to dissent of Douglas, J.); Glen, note 17 supra, at 440.
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public trials is a detrimental facet of the jury trial is not com-
pelling without further elaboration as to the supposed resulting
evils. Even within the Court there is no unanimity as to the de-
sirability of public trials for juveniles.50
The second deficiency of the opinion is that it does not con-
sider adequately the purpose of the right to a jury. In emphasiz-
ing the importance of accurate factual findings to insure fairness
in juvenile court proceedings, to the exclusion of other consi-
derations, Justice Blackmun's opinion clearly represents a de-
parture from Gault. That decision did not look solely to the fact-
finding advantages of constitutional protections in determining
whether such rights are necessary to insure fundamental fair-
ness in delinquency proceedings. Gault looked instead to the
basic protections offered the defendant by the particular right
in question- including protection against oppression by the state.
For example, in holding that juveniles are entitled to the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, the Court did acknowledge that
forced confessions, especially those of children, tend to be un-
reliable. But it was not this inaccuracy of fact-finding on which
the Gault Court based this decision. As the Court there noted:
The roots of the privilege are ... far deeper. They tap the
basic stream of religious and political principle because the
privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to
the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality
of the individual and the state.5 '
Under any "balancing" process, then, the Court should include
an examination of the protection provided by the particular right,
extending beyond a mere discussion of its positive effect on the
accuracy of factual determinations. The function served by the
right to a trial by jury is clearly spelled out in Duncan v. Lou-
isiana: "A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government."52 The right,
said the Court, reflects a reluctance to give power over a man's
life and liberty to one person.5s The fear of the arbitrary use
of power is equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings. Jus-
tice Blackmun cannot find support in Gault for failing to face
this vital policy consideration.54
50. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
51. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967). Earlier in its opinion, the
Court said that denial of due process to juveniles had resulted in in-
stances "of unfairness to individuals and inadequate or inaccurate find-
ings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of remedy." Id. at 19-20.
52. 391 U.S. at 155.
53. Id. at 156.
54 In professing to follow Gault while at the same time departing
from any sound interpretation of that case, the post-Warren Court has
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In concurring and dissenting in McKeiver, Justice Brennan
also employed a balancing test. Unlike Justice Blackmun, how-
ever, he perceived that Gault went beyond a concern solely for
accurate fact-finding. Due process, Justice Brennan maintained,
"commands, not a particular procedure, but only a result .... "r
One result it commands, he said, is the protection of the individual
from the government, and in assuring this protection the Court is
required to inquire into the adequacy of the particular proceeding
under attack rather than relying on generalizations about the ju-
venile court system as a whole. 56 Justice Brennan's scrutiny de-
tected no fault in the Pennsylvania proceedings. In Pennsyl-
vania, he pointed out, there is no ban on the public trial in
juvenile proceedings, while in the North Carolina cases the
public was excluded from the hearings. While in the adult pro-
ceeding the right to a jury is necessary to prevent oppression,
he explained, the same function can be adequately handled in
the juvenile court by the public trial, by virtue of a greater
community concern for juvenile offenders than for adult of-
fenders.5 7  Hence Justice Brennan dissented in the North Caro-
lina cases but concurred in the Pennsylvania decision. 5
Justice Brennan adequately considers the purpose of the right
to trial by jury, but fails in two respects to properly weigh the
factors which supposedly would render the right unnecessary in
juvenile delinquency proceedings. First, it is doubtful at best that
a greater community concern for juveniles in fact exists. The
Blackmun opinion noted the lack of resources and dedication in
the juvenile court system,59 and the Task Force Report on Ju-
provided another illustration of what has been called "at best, gross
negligence concerning the state ... of the controlling precedents."
Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations
on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971).
It is debatable whether even "gross negligence" can explain Justice
Blackmun's use of Gault in McKeiver. In explaining the "emphasis on
factfinding procedures," supposedly inferred from Gault and Winship,
Justice Blackmun observed that the "requirements of notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross-examination and standard of proof naturally flowed
from this emphasis." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971). The privilege against self-incrimination, the only other right
considered by the Court in Gault, is conspicuously omitted.
55. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 554 (1971).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 555.
58. Id. at 556. The requirement of protection from oppression by
the government carried special significance in the North Carolina cases,
where the charges arose out of demonstrations against the policies of
the government.
59. Id. at 547-48.
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venile Delinquency and Youth Crime observed:
One reason for the failure of the juvenile courts has been
the community's continuing unwillingness to provide the re-
sources-the people and facilities and concern-necessary to
permit them to realize their potential and prevent them from
taking on some of the undesirable features typical of lower
criminal courts in this country.60
Second, Justice Brennan does not state how public trials can pre-
vent oppression by the government. Even if the community is
more concerned with juvenile offenders than with adult offenders,
only the most sensational offense could catch the public eye, and
even then, only in cases of manifest abuse of judicial power could
the public exert so much as an indirect pressure upon the court.
A jury trial induces 12 hopefully objective citizens to focus
their attention on a particular case, thereby diminishing the like-
lihood that the accused, no matter how obscure, will be a victim of
the arbitrary exercise of power.
While different in substance, both the analysis of Justice
Brennan and that of Justice Blackmun utilize an approach that
takes into consideration the characteristics of juvenile proceed-
ings which might produce a result different from that which
would ensue were the rights of adults at issue. To those who
dissented in both cases, such special characteristics are irrelevant;
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Marshall, reiterated
Justice Black's position in Gault that a juvenile accused of a
crime "is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult."' 1
Juvenile proceedings in which a crime is alleged, contended the
dissenters, are in effect criminal proceedings since they often
result in confinement for the commission of a proscribed act.62
Hence, it was argued, Duncan v. Louisiana3 foreclosed the issue,
and no analysis such as that pursued by Blackmun and Brennan
was necessary. Thus the crucial point of departure between the
opinions of Justices Blackmun and Douglas did not focus upon the
right to trial by jury at all, but upon the broader question of
60. TAsK FORCE REPoRT, note 11 supra, at 7.
61. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 559 (1971). In Gault,
Justice Black wrote in his concurring opinion:
Where a person, infant or adult, can be seized by the State.
charged, and convicted for violating a state criminal law, and
then ordered by the State to be confined for six years [see note
12 supra], I think the Constitution requires that he be tried in
accordance with the guarantees of all the provisions of the
Bill of Rights made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 61 (1967).
62. Cf. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
63. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
whether or not the juvenile is entitled to all of the procedural
protections granted to adults under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.0 4
For Justices Douglas, Black and Marshall, the two crucial
elements which should call into play the right to jury trial,
whether for adult or juvenile, are the possibility of confinement
and the allegation of the commission of a crime.0 5 Although
Gault expressly refrains from such a broad holding,0 0 its under-
lying rationale does give some support to this view. While recog-
nizing that the juvenile courts at least in theory could provide
special benefits,67 the Gault Court was forced to "confront the
reality" of institutionalization for a number of years because of a
child's misconduct:
It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called
an Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however
euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial
school" for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which
the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser time.08
In Gault the restriction of liberty because of wrongful conduct
was referred to as the controlling factor.0 In the use of this
64. Justice Douglas's treatment of the practical aspects of juries in
juvenile proceedings is limited to the appending of an opinion by
Judge De Ciantis of the Family Court of Providence, Rhode Island.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 563-72 (1971).
65. [W]here a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to
prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to order "confine-
ment" until the child reaches 21 years of age or where the
child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect,
then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an
adult.
Id. at 559.
66. 387 U.S. at 30.
67. It is perhaps instructive to note that the benefits which the
Court in Gault enumerated are benefits pertaining to the post-adjudica-
tive stage of the juvenile court process: (1) separate treatment from
adults; (2) avoidance of the criminal label and the attaching stigma;(3) avoidance of civil disabilities resulting from adjudication of guilt of
a crime. 387 U.S. 1, 21-27. See text accompanying note 21, supra. But
another beneficial aspect of juvenile proceedings was noted by the Court
in Winship-the "informality, flexibility, or speed of the hearing at
which the factfinding takes place." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366
(1970).
68. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
69. The Court declared, for example:
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be
found to be "delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution.
Id. at 36.
[J]uvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which maylead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as
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sanction the juvenile courts are clearly akin to criminal courts. 0
That rehabilitation is the goal of the juvenile courts cannot per se
justify the withdrawal of procedural protections. Rehabilitation
is also the theoretical goal of our adult criminal courts.71
Nevertheless, a rule as broad as that proposed by the dissent
in McKeiver was not necessary to a holding that due process re-
quires the right to jury trial in delinquency proceedings. The
approach of Justices Blackmun and Brennan could have pro-
duced the same result as that reached by Justice Douglas. Such
an analysis could be supported by citing the extreme importance
attached to the right of trial by jury in Duncan v. Louisiana.2
Given the fundamental nature of the right, it could be argued,
it should be held a requirement in delinquency proceedings, ab-
sent clearly compelling reasons for withholding it. Since the
"policy" considerations cited by Justice Blackmun have been se-
riously questioned,73 and since the jury provides a unique form
of direct check on judicial power, it could be concluded that juries
should be required in juvenile delinquency proceedings which
may result in incarceration. Such an argument by the dissent
would have brought into sharper focus the weaknesses in the
opinions of Justices Blackmun and Brennan, while still not fore-
closing the eventual incorporation of other Bill of Rights protec-
tions into the juvenile court system.
"criminal" for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.... For this purpose, at least, commitment is a depriva-
tion of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will1 whether
it is called "criminal" or "civil." And our Constitution guar-
antees that no person shall be "compelled" to be a witness
against himself when he is threatened with deprivation of his
iberty ....
Id. at 49-50.
Thus, in a juvenile system designed to lighten or avoid punish-
ment for criminality, [Gault] was ordered by the State to six
years' confinement in what was in all but name a penitentiary
or jail.
Id. at 61 (Black, J., concurring).
70. Aside from capital punishment, imprisonment is the
most severely afflictive sanction employed under contemporary
penal law. It is the modern substitute for the brutalities of
earlier systems or corporal and capital punishment and is the
sanction most commonly employed by our criminal courts for
felons.
P. TAPPAw, CRIME, JUsTIcE AND CoRRECTIox 430 (1960).
71. In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949), the Court
observed:
Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become
important goals of criminal jurisprudence.
See also In re Urbasek, 38 Il. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716, 719 (1967).
72. 391 U.S. 145,156 (1968).
73. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra.
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McKeiver v. Pennsylvania has left the jury question to the
states, and it is there that the issue ultimately will be resolved
on nonconstitutional policy considerations. Recent thinking on
juvenile delinquency has provided sound policy reasons for the
state's acceptance of jury trials in the juvenile courts. It has
already been suggested that formality is no longer viewed with
the traditional hostility, and is even considered by many to have
overriding beneficial effects outweighing any negative ones.7 4
The presence of a jury would also serve to emphasize the im-
portance of the fact-finding function of the adjudicatory stage,
which has too often been obscured by the rehabilitative role of
the court.7 5 It is at the dispositional stage that what Justice
Blackmun called "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sym-
pathy, and of paternal attention which the juvenile court system
contemplates"7 6 could be brought most fruitfully into play. At
the adjudicatory stage there is much to be gained by assuring the
juvenile "that his case will be decided by 12 objective citizens.""
As juvenile courts are presently operating, however, the fear
of a flood of requests for jury trials and its ensuing case backlog
and delay, whether or not such a fear is justified,7 8 will un-
doubtedly discourage many states from experimenting with jury
trials in juvenile courts. But an increased awareness of the lim-
ited utility of total confinement has resulted in increasing efforts
to find alternatives in order to remove many cases from the juve-
nile justice system at an earlier stage.7 9 Voluntary pre-judicial
74. See note 46 supra.
75. Too often the child simply has been presumed to be in need of
rehabilitation while little consideration is given to the facts which are
to establish the jurisdiction of the court over the juvenile. This is
little short of a presumption of guilt. A recent Indiana Supreme Court
decision denying the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings re-
flected such an attitude in declaring that "[t]hese boys don't need a
jury, they need rehabilitation." Bible v. State, 254 N.E.2d 319, 328
(Ind. 1970). See also People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353
(1932); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 107 (1909).
Cf. L. CARR, DELINQUENCY CONTROL 219 (1950).
76. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971).
77. Id. at 563-64 (appendix to dissent of Douglas, J.).
78. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
79. See, Post, Hicks & Monfort, Day-Care Programs for Delin-
quents: A New Treatment Approach, 14 CRnvi. & DEL. 353 (1968);
Sheridan, Juveniles Who Commit Noncriminal Acts: Why Treat in a
Correctional System? 31 FED. PROB. 26 (1967); Stark, Alternatives to
Institutionalization, 13 CRnvi. & DEL. 323 (1967); Note, A Proposal for
More Effective Treatment of the "Unruly" Child in Ohio: The Youth
Services Bureau, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 275 (1970). For the suggestion that
a finding of fact with no disposition whatever may be of benefit, see
S. WHEELER & L. COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ITS PREVENTION
AND CONTROL 37 (1966).
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referrals to social service agencies are generally approved,80 a
procedure supported by dicta in Gault.81 Another possible al-
ternative gaining increasing support82 is less state interference
of any kind. If these options are pursued, presumably juvenile
courts will concern themselves only with the more serious of-
fenses or the more chronic repeating delinquents, making the
use of juries administratively more feasible.
80. TASK FORCE REPORT, note 11 supra, at 15; Ferster, Courtless
& Snethen, Separating Official and Unofficial Delinquents: Juvenile
Court Intake, 55 IA. L. REV. 864, 872 (1970).
81. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 31 & n. 48 (1967).
82. Most state statutes defining juvenile delinquency go beyond
the mere violation of state or federal law. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-53(d) (Supp. 1970) ("indecent or immoral" conduct); MIMN.
STAT. § 260.015(5) (e) (1971) (one who "habitually deports himself in
a manner that is injurious or dangerous to himself or others"); IoWA
CODE ANN. § 232.2(13) (d) (1969) (one who "habitually deports himself
in a manner that is injurious to himself or others"). Such laws have
been criticized as being essentially criminal statutes which are too
vague. See Comment, Statutory Vagueness in Juvenile Law: The
Supreme Court and Mattiello v. Connecticut, 118 U. PA. L REv. 143
(1969); cf. People v. Allen, 22 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 293 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282,
239 N.E.2d 879, 880 (1968) (dictum). Criticism has increasingly been
levelled at laws designed especially for children. F. ALLEN, TnE
BORDERLAND OF CRIV.A JusTicE 55 (1964); Glen, Juvenile Court Re-
form: Procedural Process and Substantive Stasis, 1970 Wis. L. Rsv. 431,
443; Haviland, Daddy Will Take Care of You: The Dichotomy of the
Juvenile Court, 17 U. KAxsAs L. RMV. 317 (1969); TASK FORCE REPORT,
note 11 supra, at 25; Note, note 79 supra; W. SHmRIAN, ED., STANDARDS FOR
JuvENEL AND FAm VY CouRTs 1-9 (1966).
The court, by virtue of such laws and broad definitions, has more
power to bring the juvenile under its control. The President's Crime
Commission warned that much of the extensive official action currently
taken against juveniles
may do more harm than good. Official action may actually
help to fix and perpetuate delinquency in the child through a
process in which the individual begins to think of himself as
delinquent and organizes his behavior accordingly.... The
undesirable consequences of official treatment are heightened in
programs that rely on institutionalizing the child. The most
informed and benign institutional treatment of the child,
even in well-designed and staffed reformatories and training
schools, thus may contain within it the seeds . . . of the very
disorder it is designed to cure.
TASK FORCE REPORT, note 11 supra, at 8. One-third of all cases handled
in juvenile courts involve repeat offenders. CmDRFns BurmAu, U.S.
DEPT. OF HEALT, EDUCATIoN AND WELFARE (Stat. Serv. No. 83) JuvEN=
COURT STATisTIcs-1964 at 1. It would seem therefore that support for
the narrowing of the grounds of juvenile court jurisdiction is not un-
reasonable.
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Constitutional Law-Due Process: Hearing on Issue of
Fault Required Prior to Driver's License Suspension
Under Financial Responsibility Law
Petitioner was involved in an auto accident in which a five
year old girl rode her bicycle into the side of his car. Based on
the accident report filed by the child's parents asserting dam-
ages of $5,000 for her injuries, respondent Director of the Georgia
Department of Public Safety notified petitioner that his license
would be suspended unless he furnished proof of insurance, se-
curity in the amount of $5,000 or a notarized release from liabil-
ity. Petitioner's proffered evidence on liability was rejected at
an administrative hearing, and he was given 30 days to comply
or suffer suspension. At trial de novo in Superior Court, petiti-
tioner's evidence was admitted and the court found him free
from fault; additionally, it was ordered that his license not be
suspended until a tort action was filed against him. The Georgia
appeals court reversed' and the Georgia Supreme Court denied
review. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that procedural due process required a presus-
pension hearing to consider whether there was a reasonable pos-
sibility that a judgment might be rendered against petitioner as
a result of the accident. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
The problems facing uncompensated motor vehicle accident
victims have given rise to various types of state legislation, in-
cluding financial and safety responsibility statutes,2 compulsory
insurance, unsatisfied judgment funds, and compensation plans.,
The Uniform Vehicle Code4 reflects the impetus of the majority
1. 121 Ga. App. 418, 174 S.E.2d 235 (1970).
2. Although some writers distinguish between financial respon-
sibility and safety responsibility laws, the greatest distinction between
them is in the label.
3. Compulsory insurance plans require proof of liability insur-
ance coverage as a prerequisite to automobile registration. Unsatis-
fied judgment funds provide relief for those who obtain judgments
against judgment-proof, uninsured motorists. Compensation plans in-
tegrate compulsory insurance into a design to provide recovery accord-
ing to a fixed schedule for all accident victims regardless of fault. See
generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VIc'nM 76-189 (1965) [hereinafter cited as KEETON & O'CONNELL].
4. UNIFORV VEHICLE CODE Ch. 7 (1968 revision) [hercinafter cited
as UVC]. The UVC has received the endorsement of the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COM-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 131 (1946).
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of the financial responsibility laws now found in 49 states and the
District of Columbia." Basic provisions of financial responsibil-
ity statutes of most states are similar.6 Generally, a driver in-
volved in an accident resulting in personal injury or property
damage in excess of a specified amount, usually $100, must submit
an accident report to a designated state official.7 Upon receipt
of that report, the designated administrative officer suspends the
license (and usually the automobile registration) of the driver
and owner of each vehicle involved unless such driver or owner
deposits security "which shall be sufficient in [the department's]
judgment to satisfy any judgment or judgments for damages re-
sulting from such accident as may be recovered against each
driver or owner."8 In the majority of states, including Georgia,
such suspension has been mandatory. 9 However, a security de-
posit has not been required of a driver if, for example, (a) he has
had liability insurance or bond in minimum amount fixed by
statute, (b) his vehicle was legally parked, (c) he had been re-
leased from liability by potential plaintiffs, or (d) he had been
adjudicated not liable.10 In six states, including Minnesota, stat-
utes have provided that no security deposit will be required if
"it appears to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the driver
or owner is not liable for any damages resulting from the acci-
dent." Even where the statute has not specifically provided
for discretionary suspension, that result has been reached by ju-
5. See KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 3, app. C for compari-
son of the various state provisions. For complete listings of statutes
see Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation,
50 CoLUm. L. REv. 300, 307 n.24 (1950); Note, A Survey of FinanciaL
Responsibility Laws and Compensation of Traffic Victims: A Proposal
for Reform, 21 VAND. L. REv. 1050, 1081, 1082 app. B (1968). Neither
listing is entirely up to date, due to recent legislative changes. The
latter reference reported that all 50 states have financial responsibility
laws. 21 VAmm. L. REv. at 1050. New Mexico recently repealed the
portions of its statute pertaining to suspension of licenses of uninsured
motorists. N.I. LAWS ch. 59, § 8 (1971).
6. The UVC will be used as the paradigm. Major variations
in state laws are noted in KnnroN & O'CoNNELLL, supra note 3, app. C.
Although the financial responsibility law effective in Georgia differs in
some respects from the UVC, its pre-Bell operation was similar. GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601-21 (1958).
7. UVC '§ 10-106.
8. UVC § 7-202(a).
9. See KEETON & O'CoNNELL, supra note 3, app. C.
10. UVC §§ 7-203, 7-207, 7-208.
11. MuNx. STAT. § 170.26(4) (1969). See COLO. REV. STAr. ANN.
§ 13-7-16 (Supp. 19865); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29 § 783 (1964); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2 (1965); N.H. REV. STAT. AmN . § 268.8 (1966); VA.
CODE ANx. § 46.1-449 (1967).
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dicial interpretation in six other states. 12 Thus, a total of 12
states have provided for determination of fault as a prerequisite
for suspension under their financial responsibility statutes. The
administrative and/or judicial review in states where suspensions
have been made without regard to fault determination has been
of little value because a hearing in such states generally has
been restricted to a determination of whether the owner or op-
erator falls within any of the statutory exceptions to the required
deposit of security. 13
Until relatively recently courts have unanimously upheld fi-
nancial responsibility laws against various constitutional chal-
lenges. 14 In 1961, the court in People v. Nothaus was the first to
strike down a financial responsibility law as a violation of due
process. 15 Even after Nothaus, financial responsibility statutes
have received uninterrupted judicial support until the Bell deci-
sion, despite some cases ordering stricter procedural require-
ments'" and despite a flurry of recent attacks.1" While numer-
ous grounds of attack have been employed without success
against the statutes, due process,1 8 equal protection,"' and dele-
12. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963);
Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1
(1950); Orr v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 220, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 454
P.2d 712 (1969); Williams v. Sills, 55 N.J. 178, 260 A.2d 505 (1970);
City of Toledo v. Bernoir, 18 Ohio St. 2d 94, 247 N.E.2d 740 (1969);
Hague v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 23 Utah 2d 299, 462 P.2d 418
(1969); Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Dep't, 478 P.2d 600 (Wyo.
1971).
13. UVC §§ 7-101, 7-102.
14. Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941). See also Annot., 35 A.L.R.
2d 1011 (1954); Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1367 (1938).
15. 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961). Nothaus was a sweeping de-
cision which dealt with substantive as well as procedural due process.
See Comment, Automobile Financial Responsibility Law Held Uncon-
stitutional, 7 UTAn L. REV. 546 (1961).
16. See Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1970), va-
cated, 403 U.S. 902 (1971); Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380
P.2d 136 (1963); Orr v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 220, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816,
454 P.2d 712 (1969).
17. See Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 40
U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971); Trujillo v. DeBaca, 320 F. Supp.
1038 (D.N.M. 1970); Llamas v. Department of Transp., 320 F. Supp.
1041 (D. Wis. 1969); Williams v. Newton, 236 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 1970);
Reutzel v. State, Dep't of Highways, 186 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1971);
Thornley v. Wyoming Highway Dep't, 478 P.2d 600 (Wyo. 1971).
18. Cf. Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 40
U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971); Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1343
(N.D. Ill. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 902 (1971); Escobedo v. State Dep't of
Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P.2d 1 (1950).
19. Cf. Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870,
222 P.2d 1 (1950); Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 416 P.2d
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gation of legislative or judicial function 20 arguments have been
the most frequent. The most serious assaults have been mounted
on due process grounds, and have been met with three arguments.
First, courts consistently have held the purpose of the statutes to
be permissible. Different purposes have been found2' but they
have fallen generally into three areas: (1) protection of future
victims through inducement to procure liability insurance volun-
tarily;22 (2) protection of past victims, either by providing a fund
to be used to satisfy any judgment recovered, by encouraging set-
tlement or by providing means of collecting unsatisfied judg-
ments; 23 and (3) promotion of safety.24  Second, many courts
have held that a driver's license is a privilege or a conditional
privilege rather than a right, and that the same standards of due
process therefore are not applicable .2 5  However, even those
courts which have recognized the use of the highways as a right
(usually a '"iberty" as distinguished from a property right) 20
have permitted legislative regulation consistent with due proc-
46 (1966); State v. Finley, 198 Kan. 585, 426 P.2d 251 (1967); Hadden v.
Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952).
20. Cf. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963);
Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952); Gillaspie v.
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 933 (1954).
21. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644-47, 647 n. 11 (1971)
and dissent. See also Grad, supra note 5, at 305-09; Netherton, High-
way Safety Under Differing Types of Liability Legislation, 15 Omo S.L.J.
110, 119 (1954); Note, Compensation Problems Created by Financially
Irresponsible Motorists, 66 HARv. L. Rnv. 1300, 1303 (1953); Note, The
Financially Irresponsible Motorist: A Survey of State Legislation, 10
Vii.L L. Rnv. 545, 550 (1965).
22. Cf. Pollion v. Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. Ill. 1970), va-
cated, 403 U.S. 902 (1971); Perez v. Tynan, 307 F. Supp. 1235, 1238 (D.
Conn. 1969).
23. Cf. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136
(1963); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 363 P.2d 180 (1961); Gillas-
pie v. Department of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954). However, this purpose has been ren-
dered much less effective by Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971),
which struck down a statutory provision making a discharge in bank-
ruptcy ineffective as a release from liability.
24. Cf. Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated,
40 U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971); Ballow v. Reeves, 238 S.W.2d 141
(Ky. App. 1951).
25. See Wall v. King, 109 F. Supp. (D. Mass. 1952), affd 206 F.2d
878 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953). But cf. Gillaspie v.
Department of Pub. Safety, 152 Tex. 459, 259 S.W.2d 177 (1953), cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 933 (1954).
26. Compare Berberian v. Lussier, 87 R.I. 226, 139 A.2d 869 (1958)




ess where they have found a "compelling public interest." That
interest usually has been evidenced by statistics dealing with
traffic accident deaths.27  Finally, the due process attack fre-
quently has been met by employing what may be termed the
"mandatory insurance" reasoning. The rationale of this argu-
ment is that since it is constitutionally permissible for a state to
require proof of financial responsibility as a prerequisite for li-
censing,28 a state also may allow financially irresponsible oper-
ators to drive until they are involved in an accident and then sus-
pend their licenses.29
In the Bell case, there was no examination of the legislative
history of the statutes and no inquiry into their judicial treat-
ment. Rather, the opinion began by examining the "mandatory
insurance" reasoning and the privilege versus right rationale for
upholding the statute. In accepting the argument that a state
may require proof of financial responsibility as a prerequisite
to licensing, it was pointed out that it does not follow that a state
may arbitrarily revoke licenses once issued. 0 Nor was the opin-
ion based on the privilege-right dichotomy. Rather, the Court
concluded that a driver's license is a personal interest which re-
quires the protection of procedural due process.8 1 It was stated
that Georgia's interest in protecting potentially uncompensated
accident victims by its fault oriented financial responsibility
statute did not justify denial of due process to its citizens.32 The
Court rejected the state's argument that fault and liability were
irrelevant to its scheme to insure financial responsibility by
pointing to the fact that those drivers adjudicated not liable
and those who obtained a notarized release from liability need
not post the otherwise required security. 3 3 State interest in mini-
mizing administrative cost was also deemed insufficient to jus-
tify denial of due process.3 4
The opinion also considered minimal due process standards.
27. Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222
P.2d 1 (1950). Cf. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 672 (1971) (dis-
senting opinion).
28. Ex Parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933); In re Opinion of the
Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N.E. 681 (1925); In re Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 81 N.H. 566, 129 A. 117 (1925).
29. Escobedo v. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 876,
222 P.2d 1, 5 (1950).
30. 402 U.S. at 539.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 541.
33. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-606 (1958).
34. 402 U.S. at 540-41.
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Declining to go into detail, the Court held that "an inquiry lim-
ited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibility
of judgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the
licensee" would suffice.35 On the question of whether a post-sus-
pension hearing was sufficient, the Court held that only an emer-
gency would justify suspension prior to the hearing and that the
instant case was not an emergency situation."0 The opinion also
allowed for alternative methods of compliance.3 7
In analyzing the Bell decision it should be noted that the
opinion dealt only with procedural due process aspects of the ap-
plication of Georgia's statute-not with its substance. Accord-
ingly, the decision must be viewed as statutory interpretation in
that it ruled only on the scope and timing of the hearing required
by Georgia's financial responsibility law. The thesis of the fol-
lowing analysis is that the Court's interpretation of the statute
which resulted in a procedural rule was not the required inter-
pretation, nor necessarily the most desirable.
It appears that the Court did not properly construe the pur-
pose of the statute and that therefore its "interest" analysis failed
to sufficiently appreciate the interest of the state in having only
insured or wealthy motorists on its highways. The opinion
stated that the single purpose of the security/suspension provi-
sions of the statute was "to obtain security from which to pay
any judgments against the licensee resulting from the accident
. "... ,38 Although there is no unanimity of opinion on the sub-
ject, it seems more reasonable that the "primary purpose is to
assure compensation for victims generally by inducing the vol-
untary purchase of insurance in order to escape the possibility
of suspension or depositing of security."39  A more comprehen-
sive discussion of the purpose of the Georgia act would have
been appropriate.40
35. Id. at 540.
36. Id. at 542 m.2.
37. Alternatives mentioned were inclusion of fault determination at
the administrative hearings now provided or at de novo judicial pro-
ceedings, stay pending adjudication in negligence proceedings, adoption
of one of the existing plans in force in other states, and institution of
an entirely new regulatory scheme. Id. at 542-43.
38. Id. at 540.
39. Note, Compensation Problems Created by Financially Irre-
sponsible Motorists, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1300, 1303 (1953). See Pollion v.
Lewis, 320 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ill. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 902 (1971);
Perez v. Tynan, 307 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1969).
40. Only a week after Bell was decided, Perez v. Campbell, 402
U.S. 637 (1971), struck down a provision in the Arizona financial re-
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If encouragement of voluntary insurance procurement is ac-
cepted as the primary purpose of financial responsibility statutes,
a strong state interest inheres in mandatory license suspension
provisions. Although a statute subjecting those who fail to pro-
cure insurance to severe sanctions may be open to criticism from
a policy viewpoint, proponents can cite convincing statistics
which show dramatic increases in insurance coverage after en-
actment of financial responsibility statutes.4 1 Viewed from the
perspective of state interest it is not altogether clear that Geor-
gia's suspension procedures were constitutionally deficient and
that the procedural rule handed down by the Court was required.
Whether institution of fault determination and presuspension
hearings will jeopardize the statutory scheme to insure victim
compensation is largely speculative, but it is conceivable that its
effectiveness will be unimpaired.4 2 In its summary treatment
of statutory purpose, however, the Court failed to even raise the
issue of whether Georgia's interest in having a high percentage
of its motorists insured is reasonably related to the statutory
scheme of fault oriented financial responsibility or to analyze how
that interest relates to the individual interests of drivers and
uncompensated victims.
In attempting to determine an individual driver's interest
in retention of his license it was noted that "[o] nce licenses are
issued. . . their continued possession may become essential in the
pursuit of a livelihood. 4 3 That reasoning can hardly be ques-
tioned.44 However, the nature of the individual's interest differs
significantly when he is allowed to drive without insurance
coverage, but is warned that if he does so and is unable to post
sponsibility statute which made a discharge in bankruptcy ineffective
as a release from liability and contained an extended discussion of the
purposes of financial responsibility acts. The Perez dissent took issue
with the majority view that the purpose of the act under considera-
tion was primarily for protection of past victims and contended that
the state statutory purpose would be impaired by the decision.
41. See Lystad, The Functioning of the Minnesota Safety Re-
sponsibility Law, 1954 INSURANcE L.J. 746; Wagner, Safety Responsibil-
ity Law-A Review of Recent Developments, 9 GA. B.J. 160, 168 (1946).
42. A comparison of insurance coverage statistics for those states
which provide for some form of fault determination with those for
states which require mandatory suspension might be helpful. Although
it has been asserted that only those laws with "teeth" in them will be
successful, there is a dearth of published information on that point.
See Administration of Safety Responsibility Laws, 22 INsuAcE CouN-
sEL J. 465 (1955).
43. 402 U.S. at 539. (Emphasis added).




security when involved in an accident his license will be sus-
pended.45  Issuance of the license is conditional-suspension
therefore is not arbitrary and can be avoided entirely by pro-
curing insurance which is considered by most drivers to be a
normal automobile operating expense.46 The Bell court failed
to consider the Georgia statute from the perspective of its con-
ditional issuance aspects, but focussed instead on license sus-
pension provisions. Had interests been considered in the sug-
gested context 47 the Bell conclusions would not have been com-
pelled.
48
Although the Bell decision probably will affect every state,
it is difficult to estimate its aggregate impact. It is likely that its
effect will be least felt in those 12 states which already have
provided some procedural safeguards for their suspension provi-
sions. Although an argument can be made that a license suspen-
sion provision in a financial responsibility statute is unconstitu-
tional on its face when it fails to provide procedural safeguards,'49
45. See Lystad, supra note 41; Murphy & Netherton, Public Re-
sponsibility and the Uninsured Motorist, 1959 INsURANcE L.J. 491.
46. See Williams v. Sills, 55 N.J. 178, 187, 260 A.2d 505, 509-10
(1970) (concurring opinion of Weintraub, C.J.).
47. Latham v. Tynan, 435 F.2d 1248, 1253 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated,
40 U.S.L.W. 3160 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971). Judge Friendly's dissent called
for a full examination of interests including a consideration of hard-
ships caused by the statute as well as its benefits.
48. Shortly before Bell, in Reutzel v. State Dep't of Highways,
186 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act against the claim that due proc-
ess required a presuspension hearing, not on the issue of fault, but on
the amount of security. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 335 U.S.
337 (1969), was distinguished on the ground that a prejudgment gar-
nishment procedure which was held to deny due process related only to
the creditor-debtor relationship and that the state interest in the citizen-
state conflict of interest should not be weighed on the same scale. The
Minnesota court deemed Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), which
held that a welfare recipient was entitled to a hearing prior to termina-
tion of benefits, to be more in point than Sniadach since it did involve
a citizen-state conflict of interest. However, after an extensive discus-
sion of Goldberg, the Reutzel opinion concluded that license suspension
provisions create problems different from deprivation of the necessities
of life by termination of welfare payments. They constitute more of an
inconvenience which the licensee can avoid by pre-accident purchase
of insurance-a normal vehicle operating expense.
49. The current situation in Minnesota reflects the potential for
problems of interpretation even where the statute explicitly provides
for fault determination and a hearing prior to suspension. In State v.
Lanning, File No. 689230 (Hennepin County Mun. Ct, Oct. 13, 1971) a
municipal court judge declared that the Minnesota Safety Responsibil-
ity Act is unconstitutional on its face for failure to provide explicitly for
prior hearings. However, there have been contrary decisions in the same
court. Undoubtedly the confusion will continue until there is an au-
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it appears that only the administration of the law need be al-
tered to comply with the presuspension hearing requirements
of the Bell decision.50 In a majority of states, including Georgia,
the required administrative or legislative changes will be more
significant. The administrative burden of procedure alteration
unquestionably will vary greatly from state to state, dependent
on many factors: established administrative and judicial review
procedures, funds, personnel, etc. Whether the burden in any
state will be sufficiently heavy to render financial responsibility
statutes unworkable is largely speculative, but it can be said with
some certainty that the Bell decision does not toll the death of fi-
nancial responsibility statutes as a matter of constitutional im-
perative. The Bell opinion made it clear that the problem could
be cured by procedural alterations without affecting the sub-
stance of the statutes.
The implications for future judicially developed procedural
requirements are not entirely clear. Bell did not present a de-
tailed outline of the scope of the required hearing. The Court
limited itself to a statement that due process required "a forum
for the determination of the question whether there is a reason-
able possibility of a judgment being rendered against [a driver]
as a result of the accident." 5' The most explicit statement re-
garding the extent of the required hearing and the scope of judi-
cial review at the time of the Bell decision had been made by the
California supreme court in Orr v. Superior Court .5 2 It was held
that a license could be suspended if there was credible evidence
that could lead to a judgment of liability against the driver with-
out regard to last clear chance or contributory negligence. The
court further stated that a reviewing court may not determine
fault, but must restrict itself to a review of administrative action.
In Rivas v. Cozens,53 a federal case decided after Bell, the Cali-
thoritative determination of the question. It appears, however, that the
view expressed in State v. Lanning is wrong, since a close examination
of Bell makes it clear that the Court dealt only with the sufficiency of
the hearing required by the statutory scheme already in force-not with
the substance of the statutory provisions. The recent summary order in
Jennings v. Mahoney, 40 U.S.L.W. 3216 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971), supports the
contrary view that it is sufficient if due process is actually afforded.
50. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273, 380 P.2d 136 (1963).
51. 402 U.S. at 542.
52. 71 Cal. 2d 220, 77 Cal. Rptr. 816, 454 P.2d 712 (1969).
53. The decision on a motion for preliminary injunction was
handed down two weeks before Bell, 327 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
After Bell was decided, the court filed a new opinion upholding the




fornia statute and the Orr standard were upheld. The Rivas
court, in reliance on the indication from Bell that Georgia's exist-
ing hearing procedure would be sufficient if it included fault
consideration, approved of California's administrative determina-
tion of fault. Such a view rejects any implication that Bell ne-
cessitates a strict adversary hearing requirement. However, some
doubt as to the validity of that conclusion is raised by Jennings v.
Mahoney54 which affirmed a Utah suspension under the Orr
standard. Although the Court affirmed the suspension because
action was stayed until appellant could present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses, it acknowledged that there was a "sub-
stantial question whether the Utah statutory scheme on its face
affords the procedural due process" required by Bell.55
It is likely that legislative changes will be proposed, particu-
larly by advocates of stringent financial responsibility statutes.
Among a wide range of legislative alternatives open to the
states,56 one interesting possibility is a statute even more strin-
gent than that involved in Bell. In basing its holding, at least in
part, on the fact that liability played a "crucial role" in the Geor-
gia statute, the Court left the path open for a statute totally ex-
cluding the concept of liability or fault. For example, a statute
which contained an express statement of purpose to encourage
insurance coverage, required an automatic minimum security de-
posit and eliminated the "standard" exceptions to the deposit re-
quirement would seem to be consistent with the Bell logic.51
Whether such a statute would be substantially more effective in
achieving financial responsibility among drivers than the current
statutes administered under the Bell standards is problematic.
In addition to these possibilities, proponents of compulsory lia-
bility insurance and no-fault insurance will undoubtedly be ac-
tive. Experience in operating under the Bell criteria will de-
termine whether some modified form of financial responsibility
statutes or an entirely different type of legislation will be used
to solve the problem of uncompensated auto accident victims.
54. 40 U.SJL.W. 3216 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1971).
55. Id. at 3217.
56. See note 37 supra.
57. Such laws have been suggested. See Murphy & Netherton,
supra note 45, at 498. A prior version of the Georgia statute construed in
Bell contained the provisions that a minimum deposit of $500 would be
required in all cases. GA. LAws no. 463, § 2 (1963).
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Insurance: Defeat of Subrogation Rights
Plaintiff bought from defendant an "all-risk" insurance pol-
icy that included coverage of losses due to the interruption of
plaintiff's business. Subsequently plaintiff entered into a con-
struction contract in which it released the contractor from liabil-
ity for any business interruption losses which might result during
construction on plaintiff's property. When contractor's negli-
gence did result in such losses, plaintiff brought suit against the
insurer to recover under the policy. The trial court rejected the
insurance company's defense that because insured defeated the
insurer's right of subrogation by releasing the contractor from
liability before the accident it thereby precluded its own right to
collect on the policy. On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court,
affirmed, holding that an insured who defeats the subroga-
tion rights of its insurer prior to loss is not precluded from re-
covery on its policy in the absence of a prohibition in the policy
against releasing potential tortfeasors. Great Northern Oil Co.
v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 189 N.W.2d 404 (Minn. 1971).
The decision is apparently the first in the country to allow an in-
sured who had defeated subrogation rights after issuance of the
policy but prior to loss to recover on his policy.'
Traditionally the common law viewed subrogation as a
principle of equity created to place the loss upon the person who
should in good conscience and justice bear it. The facts and cir-
cumstances of each case were examined to determine which party
had the greater equity.2 An insured who defeated the subroga-
1. One commentator would disagree. In King, Subrogation Un-
der Contracts Insuring Property, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 62, 86 (1951), the
author states than an insured in this position may collect on his policy
so long as the policy does not contain an express provision for subro-
gation, a warranty against or a stipulation for avoidance or discharge
of the policy. But the cases cited therein in support of this rule contain
only dicta to this effect. None of them deal with an insured having
released a potential tortfeasor after issuance of the policy.
2. See 6 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACIcE § 4054 (1942)
(footnotes omitted), where it is said:
[T]he doctrine of subrogation does not depend primarily upon
statutory or policy provisions, but originates in the general prin-
ciples of equity, and will be applied or not according to the
dictates of equity and good conscience and considerations of
public policy. Such doctrine is founded upon the relationship of
the parties and upon equitable principles, for the purpose of ac-
complishing the substantial ends of justice. Subrogation rests
on the maxim that no one should be enriched by another's loss.
It has also been said that relief by way of subrogation will not be
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tion rights of his insurer after sustaining a loss was precluded
from recovering on his policy. This rule was considered to be
an attempt to prohibit the insured from collecting twice for the
same loss.3
Where an insured defeated subrogation rights prior to loss,
courts have denied recovery where the policy expressly prohib-
ited defeat of subrogation rights,4 and where there was no spe-
cific policy prohibition. Some courts have justified their denial
of recovery in the latter case on the ground that defeat of subro-
gation rights was a breach of an "inherent" contract term.5 A
granted where the result would be inimical to sound public policy. Bur-
ford v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 2 S.W.2d 1027 (1928).
3. See Harter v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 60 F.2d 245 (6th
Cir. 1932), and cases cited therein.
Many of the cases in this area simply imply that there are good rea-
sons for the existence of subrogation, and therefore the right of subro-
gation must be protected. See Aetna Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Co., 285 U.S.
209 (1932). These "good reasons" include, besides the prevention of
double recovery, the idea that as between the insurer and the wrong-
doer, the latter should bear the loss, and that subrogation is a right of
the insurance contract which must be maintained to preserve that con-
tract as one of indemnity. See Auto Owner's Protective Exch. v. Ed-
wards, 82 Ind. App. 558, 563, 136 N.E. 577, 579 (1922), where it was said,
"Manifestly it would be unjust to compel the insurer to suffer the con-
sequences of the wrongful act of another." In Aetna the court stated
that subrogation was a "necessary incident to petitioner's contract, for
only by resort to it could the character of the contract as indemnity be
preserved." 285 U.S. at 214.
4. See, e.g., Kennedy Brothers v. Iowa State Ins. Co., 119 Iowa 29,
91 N.W. 831 (1902); Southard v. Minneapolis, S.P. & S.S.M.R.R, 60
Minn. 382, 62 N.W. 442 (1895); Bloomington v. Columbia Ins. Co., 84
N.Y. Supp. 572 (1903); Fayerweather v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 324,
23 N.E. 192 (1890); Sims v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 101 Wis. 586, 77 N.W.
908 (1899). The case law in this area comes for the most part from
cases in which the insured party was shipping goods. The carrier
would insist in his bill of lading that he have the benefits of the shipper's
insurance taken out on the goods in order to avoid liability for any loss.
Such a clause would effectively cut off the insurer's right to sue the
negligent carrier. Insurers therefore began to insert in their policies a
provision that if the insured defeated the subrogation rights of the in-
surance company by such a bill of lading, it was not liable on the policy.
For a good discussion, see R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW, BAs c TExT,
155-56 (1971).
In the instant case, the provision in the policy was:
(H) SUBROGATION. In the event of any payment under
this policy the Company shall be subrogated to all the Insured's
rights of recovery therefor against any person or organization
and the Insured shall execute and deliver instruments and pa-
pers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such right
The Insured shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights.
189 N.W.2d at 406.
5. In Down's Farmers' Warehse. Ass'n v. Insurance Co., 41 Wash.
372, 373, 376, 83 P. 423, 424, 425 (1906), the policy provided for sub-
rogation in the event of payment and that "such right shall be as-
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conflicting rule, found only in dicta, is that an insured may re-
cover in the absence of both an express provision for subrogation
and a provision prohibiting defeat of subrogation rights., The
courts have allowed the insured to recover only when he has re-
leased the tortfeasor prior to issuance of the policy. It was
thought that the insurer could have protected itself by learning
from the insured whether he had entered into any exculpatory
agreements. 7
Until Great Northern the Minnesota court had not indicated
what position it would take on the issue of defeat of subrogation
signed . . .on receiving such payment . . . ." The policy did not have
a specific provision calling for avoidance of the policy if the insured
should defeat subrogation rights. Yet the court denies the insured re-
covery, saying the insured had destroyed a valuable right given to
the insurer. See also Carstairs v. Insurance Co., 18 F. 473 (4th Cir.
1883). This justification apparently rests on the unfounded and, it has
been argued, false assumption that insured parties are well aware of
subrogation rights. In King, supra note 1, at 89, it is said, "[T] he ordi-
dinary insured is a layman who is unfamiliar with the technical quirks
of the law of subrogation, and, in all probability he has never read or
had called to his attention prior to his 'accident' the subrogation clause
in his policy." The court in Great Northern recognizes this probability
when it says the insured is seeking to recover only that which he had a
right to assume he paid the defendants a premium to insure. In a
footnote the court says:
The action may have been no more deliberate . . .than that of
an owner of an automobile who ... exculpates the garage
owner from any liability for loss of the automobile, and who,
subsequently suffering loss of the vehicle resulting from the
garage owner's negligent failure to keep the garage door locked,
quite naturally would assume that he would recoup his loss un-
der the insurance policy covering his automobile.
189 N.W.2d at 409.
6. See note 1 supra. The rationale is evidently similar to the one
used in those cases where the insured had defeated subrogation rights
by releasing the tortfeasor before the issuance of the policy. See note
7 infra. In King, supra note 1, at 86, it was put:
The reasoning behind this seems to be that the insurer has the
right of subrogation only with respect to rights actually pos-
sessed by the insured at the time the loss occurs, so that if the
insured has by prior agreement effectively prevented any claim
from arising in himself, the insurer has no right to complain.
7. Gerlach v. Grain Shippers Mut. Fire Ass'n, 156 Iowa 333, 136
N.W. 691 (1912); Jackson Co. v. Boylston Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Mass. 508,
2 N.E. 103 (1885); Pelzer Mfg. Co. v. Sunfire Office, 36 S.C. 213, 15 S.E.
562 (1892). In Pelzer it was said:
Insurance companies ... are presumed to know what facts and
circumstances are material to the risk offered much better than
the persons who are applying for the insurance, and if they
choose to accept the risk without inquiry, and when a loss oc-
curs . . . common honesty and fair dealing forbid that this shall
operate as a forfeiture of the policy . . ..
36 S.C. at 269, 15 S.E. at 583. In Jackson the court notes that the in-
surer did not care to see the receipts the insured had received from the
carrier whereby the insured had exonerated the carrier from liability.
[Vol. 56:274
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after issuance of the policy, but prior to loss. The leading case in
Minnesota, Bacich v. Homeland Insurance Co.,8 stated the general
rule that a release of liability given to a tortfeasor by the insured
bars the insured's right of action on the policy. By the facts of
Bacich, however, the rule only applies to a release given after loss
has occurred.9 The instant case distinguishes Bacich on this
basis.
The court in Great Northern follows the traditional notion
that subrogation is a tool of equity depending upon a balancing
of the equities of the parties.10 In balancing the equities the
court focuses on three considerations which favor recovery by
the insured. First, the insurer could easily have protected him-
self from losing his subrogation rights by inserting an appropri-
ate provision in the policy. The insurer should have been fa-
miliar with the possible methods by which an insured could de-
feat subrogation rights and could have protected itself when it
was drawing up its contract." The insured, on the other hand,
as the court points out, may have been ignorant that it was de-
feating subrogation rights when it released the contractor from
possible future liability. This assumption seems tenuous if
dealing with a large business, but it appears to be correct in the
majority of cases where the insured is a non-commercial entity.
Furthermore, it would seem inequitable if an insured were de-
nied recovery for committing an act not prohibited by his policy.
Second, the court notes that public policy favors upholding
the kind of exculpatory clause the insured entered into with the
negligent contractor. The insured, the court notes, should be
able to promote its business interests by avoiding overlapping in-
surance coverage. The insured and its contractor should not both
be required to carry insurance covering the same loss. One of
the purposes behind subrogation law is ensuring that as between
the insurer and the wrongdoer the latter should bear the loss.12
8. 212 Minn. 375, 3 N.W.2d 665 (1942).
9. The insured had recovered his fire loss from the wrongdoer by
means of a suit in which he recovered his damages via the cancellation
of a mortgage debt he owed the wrongdoer on the building destroyed.
The court denied him the right to recover again from the insurer.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. The insurer had provided in the policy: "The Insured shall
do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights." No clause prohibited a
release prior to loss.
12. See note 3 supra. Some have argued that this is an improper
goal. The tortfeasor is not a wrongdoer, but rather a victim of mo-
mentary inadvertence. Why should he bear the loss as opposed to the
insurer who has been paid a premium which arguably compensates for
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But where public policy upholds the validity of exculpatory
clauses, there is essentially a policy determination that there are
reasons for society not seeking to undo the contract. Equity in
such a case does not demand that the loss be shifted from the
insurer in order to place it upon the person who caused it.
Finally, the court argues that the hazard which caused the
loss was covered and reflected in the premium. The insurer had
argued that the insured's release enlarged the risk to which the
insurer was exposed by releasing the building contractor from
liability. The court's conclusion is in accord with the argument
that subrogation returns represent a windfall to the insurer."
The insured's premium represents what the insurer must be
paid to earn a reasonable return on its investment. The returns
the insurer receives from its successful legal actions against per-
sons who have caused the loss are not taken into consideration
when computing the premium. Such recoveries represent "ex-
tra" profit or, in a sense, overcompensation for the risk the in-
surance company bears. Therefore, the risk which the insurer
bears would not be enlarged beyond what it contracted to insure
against when it is denied subrogation.
Without further discussion, the court notes that the argu-
ments presented by the insurer are not without merit."' How-
ever, an analysis of these arguments persuasively demonstrates
the propriety of the court's decision. First, the insurer argued
that there was no basis for treating an insured who had subroga-
tion rights before loss differently from one who had defeated
them after loss. This argument fails to consider that the ma-
jor rationale for subrogation, prevention of double recovery, is
not a paramount consideration where subrogation rights are de-
feated prior to loss. The key distinction between an ante-loss
settlement, i.e., release of liability, and a post-loss settlement is
that in the former the insured has no idea what the extent of
that loss? In King, supra note 1 at 64, it is noted that the tortfeasor,
since he has suffered damage himself, is "likely to be in a relatively
poor position to reimburse the insurer."
13. While subrogation returns may enter indirectly into the
computation of premium rates, they constitute a relatively
inconsequential factor. Investigation reveals that subrogation
is not specifically included by name as one of the very many
items which go into premium computations .... Some com-
panies include subrogation returns in a residual salvage account
which is one of the less inportant sources of the company's in-
come. Moreover, since subrogation returns are subject to the
fluctuating attitudes of the courts they are peculiarly unreliable
bases of actuarial prediction.
Comment, Insured's Right of Subrogation Against Insured Who Has
Recovered a General Verdict, 42 COLUM. L. REv. 1368, 1371 n.12 (1942).
14. 189 N.W.2d at 408.
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damage will be, should a loss occur. Accordingly, the ante-loss
settlement will never approximate the size of the loss. For
example, in Great Northern the small reduction in price the
insured may have received on the construction job was but a
small fraction of the actual loss. Denying the insured recovery
in such a situation on the basis of prevention of double recovery
would not be justified.' 5
Further, the insurer contended that the insured had deprived
it of a valuable right afforded by the insurance contract-the
right to recoup its loss from the one primarily liable. This argu-
ment ignores the fact that subrogation rights were not created for
the benefit of insurance companies, but were a method of deny-
ing the insured a double recovery and denying the wrongdoer an
escape from the loss he caused.'0 Any "rights" accruing to the
insurer are simply the necessary expedients to accomplish these
ends. Thus, as in Great Northern, where these ends are absent,
no such "right" should accrue to the insurer. In addition, the in-
surer's argument incorporates the notion that subrogation is so
well known an incident of insurance contracts as not to require
spelling out in the contract.' 7  This notoriety may exist among
insurers, but it has been argued to be non-existent among in-
sureds.'
At a minimum the court in Great Northern has emphasized
that it will require insurance companies to inform insureds in
their policies what activities will prevent recovery on their poli-
cies.' 9 Perhaps it also indicates a movement toward allowing
third persons in some circumstances to take advantage of the in-
sured's policy. By leaning heavily upon the equities in its reso-
15. If a double recovery theory is applied, it should only operate
to reduce insured's recovery from the insurer to the extent that his con-
struction contract cost him less because of the exculpatory clause con-
tained in it.
16. "The right of the subrogation is not a right that insures ...
recovery. .. " Gerlach v. Grain Shippers Mut. Fire Ins. Ass'n, 156
Iowa 333, 336, 136 N.W. 691, 692. It has also been said that subroga-
tion is not an absolute right, but one which depends upon the equities of
each case. Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U.S. 659 (1877).
17. See Down's Farmers' Warehse. Ass'n v. Insurance Co., 41 Wash.
372, 373, 376, 83 P. 423, 424, 425 (1906).
18. See note 5 supra.
19. The decision is a step in the direction of allowing subrogation
only when the insurer has fully explained subrogation rights and the
terms of forfeiture under the policy. Nothing in the decision precludes
insurers from inserting a provision into the policy prohibiting the in-
sured from defeating subrogation rights and saying nothing to the in-
sured about it.
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lution, the court retains the power to determine just what those
circumstances are, and to protect insureds from overreaching by
insurers.
Statute of Frauds: Oral Agreement Promising Performance
By Third Party Upheld Against Promisor
The original English Statute of Frauds' required written
evidence2 of certain obligations for them to be enforceable. The
provision of the Statute of Frauds regarding promises to answer
for the debt of another was intended to prohibit both the imposi-
tion of a bad debt by perjury and an expansion of a promise or
words of encouragement when the promisor had received no
benefit.3 The Minnesota Statute of Frauds provides:
No action shall be maintained, in either of the following cases,
upon any agreement, unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, is in writing,
and subscribed by the party charged therewith:
(2) Every special promise to answer for the debt, default or
doings of another .... 4
Thus, to hold a party liable under a surety arrangement in Min-
nesota there must be written evidence of the promise.
In J.J. Brooksbank Co., Inc. v. American Motors, 184 N.W.2d
796 (Minn. 1971), plaintiff, a car rental agency, alleged an oral
agreement with defendant American Motors' fleet manager,
whereby the defendant was to arrange for the sale and repur-
chase of automobiles for use in plaintiff's business. Defendant
told plaintiff that a franchised dealer would deliver the cars and
handle the repurchase of them one year later. In 1963 plaintiff
purchased and resold a fleet of cars pursuant to this plan. The
dealer provided plaintiff with a written repurchase agreement
for the automobiles, and plaintiff made out a purchase order ad-
dressed to American Motors which was sent to the dealer. In the
fall of 1964, plaintiff purchased 10 more automobiles. Although
plaintiff had been assured by defendant that the dealer would re-
purchase them, no written repurchase agreement was provided
for three of these 1965 model vehicles. Defendant later notified
plaintiff that it did not intend to repurchase these three cars.
Plaintiff sold the cars at an auction and brought suit for the dif-
1. Stat. 29, Car. II, c. 3 (1677).
2. Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396, 399 (Mass. 1841).
3. See Wilson v. Hentges, 29 Minn. 102, 104, 12 N.W. 151, 152
(1882); 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 448 (1960); Arant, A Rationale for
the Interpretation of the Statute of Frauds in Suretyship Cases, 12
MDrN. L. REv. 716, 743 (1928). See also Morris, The Leading Purpose
Doctrine As Applied to the Statute of Frauds, 62 W. VA. L. REv. 339
(1960).
4. AM=. STAT. § 513.01 (1967).
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ference between the auction receipts and the amount that would
have been received under the purported agreement with defend-
ant. The complaint was technically defective," and the court re-
fused to allow amendment." At the close of plaintiff's evidence,
the trial court directed a verdict for defendant on the basis that
the facts alleged an oral collateral undertaking by defendant,
enforcement of which is barred by the Statute of Frauds. A
second action, alleging a promise on the part of defendant to
secure a dealer to repurchase, was dismissed on the basis of
res judicata. The two actions were consolidated on appeal. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the evidence raised a ques-
tion of fact-whether defendant's assurances that the automo-
biles would be repurchased was an original undertaking or
merely a promise to guarantee the dealer's obligation to repur-
chase-and since only in the latter case is the enforcement of
the promise barred by the Statute of Frauds, a directed verdict
was erroneous. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial
to determine whether the promise was original or collateral.
The terms "original" and "collateral" have been used to dis-
tinguish between promises which are respectively without and
within the Statute of Frauds. Two major tests have developed
for determining which promises are original and which are col-
lateral. The first, the "entire credit" test 7 requires that in order
5. The complaint alleged that defendants themselves agreed to
repurchase the cars. However, such an agreement was prohibited by
defendant's franchise agreements with its dealers. 184 N.W.2d at 797-98.
6. It appears from the record that the amendment was refused
because the court found that the complaint as amended contained the
same allegations as the original complaint. 184 N.W.2d at 798.
7. See, e.g., Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns 29 (N.Y. 1811),
which states this test in the following manner: "If the whole credit is
not given to the person who comes in to answer for another, the under-
taking is collateral." Id. at 37.
The leading Minnesota case, Cole v. Hutchinson, 34 Minn. 410, 26
N.W. 319 (1886), utilized the entire credit test with two qualifications
applicable, at least, to promises to pay for goods or services. First, the
promisor must receive credit as the purchaser of the goods rather than
as the guarantor. Second, the proof of the identity of the one who has
received the credit of the promisee is controlled by the circumstances
under which the goods are delivered. Thus, when the promisee deliv-
ers the goods, the actions and words of the parties determine whether
the promisee should view the promisor as purchasing goods to be de-
livered to another or whether the promisee should view the promisor as
guarantor of the purchase price of goods actually purchased by a third
party. Cole emphasized that a promise may be collateral even though
the debt of the third party was not in existence at the time the promise
was made.
See Maurin v. Fogelberg, 37 Minn. 23, 32 N.W. 858 (1887); 3
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 462 (1960).
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for the obligation to be original as to the promisor, the reason for
the promisee's act must be based entirely on considerations linked
to the promisor, rather than to a third party creditor. Thus, it is
said that the "entire credit" for the promisee's act is given to the
promisor. This test is primarily applicable to a situation where
the promisor promises to perform for the pronisee if the prom-
isee confers a benefit upon a third party who is usually desig-
nated as the debtor. If the promisee furnishes goods or services
to the third party on the basis of the third party's promise to pay,
and the promisor merely promises to pay the promisee in the
event that the third party defaults, the promise on the part of the
promisor is collateral and must be in writing to be enforceable.
The second major test which has been used to distinguish be-
tween collateral and original promises is the "leading purpose"
test. This test has been stated as follows:
The terms original and collateral promise, though not used in
the statute, are convenient enough, to distinguish between the
cases, where the direct and leading object of the promisor is to
become the surety or guarantor of another's debt, and those
where, although the effect of the promise is to pay the debt of
another, yet the leading object of the undertaker is, to subserve
or promote some interest or purpose of his own.8
Thus the "leading purpose" test focuses upon the promisor's rea-
son for making the promise and requires that the oral promise be
enforced if the promisor was benefited by the performance of the
promisee. This benefit is considered as evidence that the prom-
isor's leading purpose was to promote his own interest. Although
these two tests are the primary ones which have been proposed
to distinguish between original and collateral promises, many
other tests have also been considered.9
Whether the leading purpose test or the entire credit test is
8. Nelson v. Boynton, 3 Metc. 396, 400 (Mass. 1841). See also
Calamari, The -Suretyship Statute of Frauds, 27 FORD. L. REv. 332, 341
(1959).
9. Williston lists seven commonly suggested tests: (1) A prom-
ise which is in form a guaranty performable only on default by a prin-
cipal debtor is within the statute; (2) A promise to pay a debt of an-
other for which the other continues to be liable is within the statute;(3) A new promise is presumptively within the statute unless the
original debt is discharged; (4) The governing distinction is the purpose
of the promisor whether to gain an advantage for himself or to secure
it for another; (5) A promise which amounts in substance to a promise
to pay the debtor's debt is not within the statute; (6) Whether a
new and beneficial consideration has been received by a new promisor
is vital; (7) The test submitted to be the accurate one except in regard
to joint promises, is whether a promisor is, to the actual knowledge of
the creditor, a surety; if so, his promise is within the statute. 3
WILUSTON ON CONTRACTS § 462 (1960).
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used, the question of whether the promise is original or collateral
is one of the intent of the parties.' 0 The form of the promise
should be considered, and if no circumstances conflict with the
form of the promise, the prima facie presumption created by the
form is controlling.'1 However, when evidence is conflicting or
language ambiguous, the jury must determine in the light of all
circumstances surrounding the agreement 12 what the intent of
the parties was in order to decide who was the recipient of the
credit, or what was the leading purpose of the promisor.'" There-
fore, the form of the promise is not necessarily determinative of
intent if circumstances such as the receipt of benefit by the
promisor warrant the opposite conclusion. 1 4
10. Rolfsmeyer v. Rau, 198 Minn. 213, 215, 269 N.W. 411, 412 (1936);
accord, Goldsmith v. Erwin, 183 F.2d 432 (1951).
11. For example, in Askier v. Donnelly, 157 Minn. 502, 195 N.W.
494 (1923), the alleged promise "I will see that you get your pay" was
declared to be collateral. The court's opinion indicated that the plaintiff
did not try to explain why he used language recognizing the debt as
the debt of another. Judgment was directed for the defendant because
plaintiff had not unequivocably promised to pay.
12. E.g., Conrad v. Clarke, 106 Minn. 430, 119 N.W. 214, rehearing
denied 106 Minn. 434, 119 N.W. 482 (1909); Amort v. Christofferson,
57 Minn. 234, 59 N.W. 304 (1894); Maurin v. Fogelberg, 37 Minn. 23, 32
N.W. 858 (1887); Winslow v. Dakota Lumber, 32 Minn. 237, 20 N.W. 145
(1884). See also 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 465 (1960); Riesenfield
& Mussman, Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds: A Survey of Min-
nesota Law, 31 MINN. L. REv. 1, 18 (1946); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 246
(1951).
Regardless of which test is used there are other basic premises
which the courts recognize in the determination of whether a promise is
original or collateral. For instance, it is generally recognized that an
oral contract cannot come within the purview of the Statute without a
main or substantive liability of a third party to which it is collateral.
See Cole v. Hutchinson, 34 Minn. 410, 26 N.W. 319 (1886); Yale v. Edger-
ton, 14 Minn. 144 (1869). See also Kilbride v. Moss, 113 Cal. 432, 45
P. 812 (1896); CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 395 (1950); 3 WILLISTON ON
CONTRA cTS § 454 (1960); Calamari, supra note 8, at 333.
Another premise is that acts by the parties subsequent to the
transaction, such as charging the price to a certain person, or demand-
ing payment, are competent evidence but should be treated in the na-
ture of admissions. Cole v. Hutchinson, 34 Minn. 410, 411, 26 N.W.
319, 320 (1886). Thus, evidence to refute the implication of such an act
is freely allowed. See, e.g., Amort v. Christofferson, 57 Minn. 234, 59
N.W. 304 (1894) (jury found an original promise even though creditor
requested note from third party); Winslow v. Dakota Lumber Co., 32
Minn. 237, 20 N.W. 145 (1884) (goods were charged on company's books
to third party).
13. See Rolfsmeyer v. Rau, 198 Minn. 213, 269 N.W. 411 (1936);
Kenney Co., Inc. v. Horne, 194 Minn. 357, 260 N.W. 358 (1935); Marckel v.
Raven, 186 Minn. 125, 242 N.W. 471 (1932).
14. Rolfsmeyer v. Rau, 198 Minn. 213, 216, 269 N.W. 411, 412(1936). See Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 (1891); Timm v. Aiton, 150
Minn. 450, 185 N.W. 510 (1921); Amort v. Christofferson, 57 Minn. 234,
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The basic premise the Minnesota courts have operated under
in construing this provision of the Statute of Frauds has been
that the Statute must be narrowly construed. This results in as
many promises as possible being held to be without the Statute
and, therefore, enforceable.15 Any evidence of a promise to
pay1c or evidence of benefit to the promisor 17 is deemed sufficient
to present a jury question as to the type of promise. Consequent-
ly, only a very few cases which hinge upon the issue of whether
a promise is collateral or original are not submitted to the jury in
Minnesota.' s
The fact situation of the Brooksbank case is peculiar be-
cause the alleged promise was to secure a dealer to repurchase
rather than to pay a certain amount. However, the purchase and
repurchase prices were agreed upon by American Motors and the
plaintiff, even though the repurchase price was paid by the
dealer. The court points to the fact that defendant initiated
these negotiations' 9 and the fact that plaintiff believed the un-
derlying agreement was with defendant 20 as evidence from
which one could conclude that the agreement was original. Em-
phasis is placed on the fact that the plaintiff and defendant un-
derstood the nature of the promise differently. The plaintiff-
promisee had an inaccurate understanding of the relationship be-
tween the promisor and the third party. Plaintiff believed, as
evidenced by the charge in his first complaint, that the dealer was
an agent of American Motors. The fact that the purchase order
was made out to American Motors and was given to the dealer
59 N.W. 304 (1894); Grant v. Wolf, 34 Minn. 32, 24 N.W. 289 (1885);
Wilson v. Hentges, 29 Minn. 102, 12 N.W. 151 (1882); Nichols, Shep-
hard & Co. v. Allen, 22 Minn. 283 (1875); 3 WILLSTON ON CON-
TRACTS § 465 (1960); Riesenfield & Mussman, supra note 12, at 18, 30.
15. See Hall v. Oleson, 168 Minn. 308, 310, 210 N.W. 84 (1926);
Upton Mill & Elevator Co. v. Baldwin Flour Mills, 147 Minn. 205, 209,
179 N.W. 904, 905 (1920); Osborne & Co. v. Baker, 34 Minn. 307, 309,
25 N.W. 606, 608 (1885).
16. E.g., Wolfson v. Kohn, 210 Minn. 13, 297 N.W. 109 (1941).
17. E.g., Kenney Co., Inc. v. Horne, 194 Minn. 357, 260 N.W. 358
(1935); Marckel v. Raven, 186 Minn. 125, 242 N.W. 471 (1932). This
rule is in marked contrast to a few other jurisdictions. For instance, in
New York both evidence of benefit to the promisor and evidence of
the assumption of a primary obligation are necessary to make a case for
the jury. See, e.g., Guinn Co., Inc. v. Mazza, 296 F.2d 441 (D.C. Cir.
1961) (applying New York law); Culkin v. Smith, 57 Misc. 2d 901, 293
N.Y.S.2d 913 (1968).
18. E.g., Bruce v. Walters, 180 Minn. 441, 231 N.W. 16 (1930); As-
kier v. Donnelly, 157 Minn. 502, 195 N.W. 494 (1923).
19. 184 N.W.2d at 798.
20. Id. at 799.
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also supports this proposition. Lack of mutual understanding
strengthens the plaintiff's argument that a jury question exists.-'
The court also points to the interest which defendant had in
plaintiff's purchase of the automobiles as evidence on which a
finding of an original promise could be based.
The court's analysis, while not mentioning any specific test or
standards, is more consistent with the leading purpose test than
the entire credit test because of the emphasis on benefit to the
promisor. For instance, the court mentions that the purpose of
defendant's fleet sales program-to increase public awareness of
American Motors cars-is evidence of the defendant's interest
in promisee's performance which consisted of the purchase of the
cars.2 2 Thus, by pointing out evidence of defendant-promisor's
interest, the court indicates that the jury is justified in conclud-
ing that promisor's leading purpose was to serve his own inter-
ests.
In Minnesota both the leading purpose and the entire credit
tests exist, and each has been used frequently.2 3 However, the
distinction between the two tests often has been blurred by the
court. The entire credit test generally has been used to deter-
mine if a promise was original or collateral when the promise
was made prior to the creation of the debt,24 while the leading
purpose test has been used where there was a pre-existing debt.2-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 800.
23. E.g., Marckel v. Raven, 186 Minn. 125, 242 N.W. 471 (1932);
Conrad v. Clarke, 106 Minn. 430, 119 N.W. 214, rehearing denied 106
Minn. 430, 119 N.W. 482 (1909); Winslow v. Dakota Lumber Co., 32
Minn. 237, 20 N.W. 145 (1884).
24. See, e.g., Bennett v. Thuet, 98 Minn. 497, 108 N.W. 1 (1906);
Amort v. Christofferson, 57 Minn. 234, 59 N.W. 304 (1894); Maurin v.
Fogelberg, 37 Minn. 23, 32 N.W. 858 (1887); Winslow v. Dakota Lumber
Co., 32 Minn. 237, 20 N.W. 145 (1884).
25. Prior to Brooksbank there were indications that the Minnesota
court would apply the leading purpose rule where there was no pre-
existing debt. See Kenney Co. v. Horne, 194 Minn. 357, 360, 260 N.W.
358, 359 (1935); Conrad v. Clarke, 106 Minn. 430, 433, 119 N.W. 214, 215
(1909); King v. Franklin Lumber, 80 Minn. 274, 83 N.W. 170 (1900);
Riesenfield & Mussman, supra note 12, at 32.
In Burkel v. Pro-Vid-All Mills, 273 Minn. 297, 141 N.W.2d 143 (1966),
relied upon in Brooksbank, there was no pre-existing debt and defend-
ant-promisor was to allow plaintiff-promisee's salary to be paid by a
third party owner from the sale proceeds rather than the profits. De-
fendant financed a business owned by a third party in which plaintiff
was employed. Although the operation was financially unstable, de-
fendant induced plaintiff to remain in the third party's employ by prom-
ising that plaintiff was to be paid from the proceeds of sales, regardless
of the profits. In essence, Burkel and Brooksbank present the same
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The emphasis which Brooksbank places upon the benefit the
defendant-promisor received from the agreement with plaintiff
is consistent with the policies underlying the Statute of Frauds.
Where a party has received no benefit from a disputed promise,
he should not be held to an oral promise and should be bound
only by the exact terms of a written one.2 0 However, if he has
received some benefit, he should be held to his promise even
though the promise was not in writing. In such a case, this
benefit is evidence of the nature of the promise in lieu of a writ-
ten memorandum.
The leading purpose test is preferable to the entire credit
test in that it better protects only one who has received no bene-
fit from his oral promise. For example, if the purpose of the
promisor's oral promise was to secure his own benefit or interest,
then under the leading purpose test the promise would be original
and enforceable. However, under the entire credit test, despite
the fact that the promisor may have received something of value,
he would not be held to his promise if the promisee had any basis
for relying upon the credit of a third party, either partially or
wholly. Thus the entire credit test ignores the crucial consid-
eration of whether the promisor benefited from the acts of the
promisee.
Since the main inquiry in cases such as Brooksbank is to de-
termine the parties' intent,27 the court's emphasis on the lack of
mutual understanding of the nature of the promise is important.
A promise cannot come within the statute if the creditor was
justified in supposing it to be a primary obligation. " s Brooks-
bank believed that the dealer was an agent of American Motors.
If this relationship had existed, American Motors' promise to pay
the dealer's debts would be original and not be within the Stat-
ute.29 Moreover, if the promise to get the dealer to repurchase
had been a joint promise on the part of the dealer and American
situation: a promise by a party, who will benefit from the perform-
ance of the promisee, that a third party, who is closely tied to the
promisor, will do a particular act. In both cases the promisor as
well as the third party benefited. Thus the fact that a party is to bene-
fit from performance by the promisee strongly indicates that the prom-
ise will be regarded as original.
26. See Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479 (1891).
27. "[T]he real character of a promise depends largely on whether
the parties mutually understood it to be a collateral or a direct prom-
ise." 184 N.W.2d at 799. See Davis v. Patrick, 141 U.S. 479, 489 (1891).
See also cases cited in note 13 supra.
28. Rolfsmeyer v. Rau, 198 Minn. 213, 216, 269 N.W. 411, 413 (1936).
29. See Arant, supra note 3. There are no Minnesota cases.
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Motors for the benefit of both, the Statute of Frauds would not
have been applicable.30 Thus, if Brooksbank had no reason to
know that this was not a joint promise, or that the dealer was
not an agent of American Motors, it seems equitable that the
promise should not be enforced, as long as the promisor re-
ceived some benefit.3 1
Again, the leading purpose test is preferable to determine the
intent of the parties. That test focuses directly on intent by
considering why the promisor entered into the agreement. On
the other hand, the entire credit test considers on whose credit
the performance of the promisee was based. It is desirable that
the Minnesota Supreme Court has used only the leading purpose
test in its most recent cases, because that test goes more directly
to the point in terms of the traditional concerns behind the Stat-
ute of Frauds.
Undoubtedly, oral agreements such as the one in the instant
case are entered into every day. Realistically, it seems only logi-
cal to consider the agreement to be an original undertaking on the
part of American Motors. At trial there was conflict as to ex-
actly what American Motors' fleet sales representative promised,
but no attempt was made to say that the fleet representative did
not negotiate with the plaintiff. Defendant's pretrial statement
suggests that the real reason why American Motors and the
dealer would not buy back the three automobiles was that they
considered them to be ineligible for repurchase because they
thought that the cars had not been used in rent-a-car service
and that the cars had excessively deteriorated. However, these
issues were not relied upon by the courts in their opinions. A
narrow construction of the Statute of Frauds can serve to keep
companies honest and prevent them from using technicalities to
avoid agreements whenever they become angry with the other
party. This is as it should be. Cases such as Brooksbank serve
as a warning that companies may not avail themselves of the
Statute of Frauds to renege on one of their normal business un-
dertakings from which they have received something of value.
Also, the case serves to remind promisees of the possible dangers
of not requiring a written memorandum of such an agreement.
The decisions which have announced the rules for the appli-
cation of the Statute of Frauds to contracts of guaranty have not
30. See Masters v. Bilder, 101 Ore. 322, 199 P. 920 (1921); Wain-
wright v. Straw, 15 Vt. 215, 40 Am. Dec. 675 (1843).
31. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 90 (1941).
[Vol. 56:281
1971] CASE COMMENTS 289
established definite criteria for determining when the promise is
collateral or original. Doubt remains as to the amount of bene-
fit the promisor must receive, whether this benefit is to be quan-
titatively or qualitatively measured, and each case must turn on
its facts. Yet this indefiniteness is desirable if one considers that
the objective of the court is to determine the intent of the parties
at the time the promise was made. It is important to allow the
jury sufficient discretion so that the credibility of the witnesses
may be a factor in the determination of what type of promise
was made. At the same time the court may order a directed
verdict for the defendant in cases where there is no evidence of
benefit to the defendant.

